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Joint Enterprise and Murder
Simon Parsons*
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It has been said that the law relating to joint enterprise is complex,
controversial and harsh.1 This comment will explain why this is so when
considering the relationship between joint enterprise and murder. The
term ‘complicity’ will be used here as a general term encompassing aid,
abet, counsel or procure (i.e. accessorial liability)2 and joint enterprise.
To keep this comment at a reasonable length some knowledge of law of
complicity will be assumed. The issue of complicity arises when two or
more persons are involved in committing of a criminal offence. This
seems relatively straightforward, but the factual simplicity hides the
difficult legal questions involved. These difficulties centre on two issues.
First, there is the question of whether assisting or encouraging crime is
a body of law separate from where there is a joint enterprise or common
purpose to commit a crime. Secondly, when is there secondary liability
for a collateral or ‘parasitic’ crime to a joint enterprise? It will be helpful
to start by defining the term ‘joint enterprise’.
What is a joint enterprise?
In R v A3 Hughes LJ defined ‘joint enterprise’ as follows:
The expressions ‘common enterprise’ or ‘joint enterprise’ may be used
conveniently by the courts in at least three related but not identical
situations:
i) Where two or more people join in committing a single crime, in circum-
stances where they are, in effect, all joint principals, as for example when
three robbers together confront the security men making a cash delivery.
ii) Where D2 aids and abets D1 to commit a single crime, as for example
where D2 provides D1 with a weapon so that D1 can use it in a robbery, or
drives D1 to near to the place where the robbery is to be done, and/or waits
around the corner as a getaway man to enable D1 to escape afterwards.
iii) Where D1 and D2 participate together in one crime (crime A) and in the
course of it D1 commits a second crime (crime B) which D2 had foreseen he
might commit. These scenarios may in some cases overlap.4
In the first situation the law of complicity is straightforward and clear as
the two or more persons are joint principals in a joint enterprise. In the
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1 Professor David Ormerod commentary to R v Yemoh [2009] Crim LR 888 at 894 and
to R v Lewis [2010] Crim LR 870 at 872.
2 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s. 8.
3 [2010] EWCA Crim 1622.
4 Ibid. at [7].
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second situation this is assisting crime and shows that joint enterprise is,
in many cases, merely an incident of accessorial liability. It is with the
third situation that the courts have had difficulty in defining secondary
liability. To take a well-known example: Steve and Peter agree to burgle
Victor’s house. Steve, aware of Peter’s violent nature, entreats him not to
attack Victor should he discover their burglary. Peter says he will not be
violent, but Steve, aware of Peter’s nature, knows that Peter might not
keep his word. During the burglary Peter attacks Victor, killing him. If
Peter killed Victor with an intention to kill or to cause serious harm, he
would be guilty of murder. Steve would also be guilty of murder (the
collateral offence) if he foresaw a real risk that, during the burglary,
Peter might kill Victor with intent to kill or cause serious harm.5 This
principle was first stated by the Privy Council in R v Chan Wing-siu6 and
accepted into English law in R v Hyde.7 The Hyde principle was applied by
the House of Lords in R v Powell and Daniels; English8 and in R v Rahman.9
Steve would be guilty of murder because he was subjectively reckless as
to the risk of it. There is no need to show that Steve assisted or
encouraged the murder, nor that he intended or agreed that it be
committed. Whilst both Peter and Steve are both guilty of murder and
would receive the mandatory life sentence there is no parity of culpabil-
ity.10 So the law is harsh on Steve. A moral basis for Steve being guilty of
any offence committed by Peter which is collateral to their joint enter-
prise is that in having a common purpose to commit crime A (the
burglary), foreseeing that this might result in Peter also committing
crime B (the murder), he has increased in a blameworthy way the risk
that crime B might be committed. It is in this third situation that
accessorial liability and joint enterprise part company as in respect of the
collateral offence it is the law of joint enterprise alone that governs the
secondary liability.
To add to the complexity of the law a number of recent Court of
Appeal decisions have held that it is sufficient that Steve foresaw the
unlawful killing and gloss over the requirement that Steve, to be guilty
of murder, needs also to foresee Peter’s murderous intent.11 This reflects
Lord Bingham’s obiter dictum in R v Rahman12where he accepted the
5 If Steve foresaw a risk of violence to Victor, but did not foresee Peter’s murderous
intent, then the authorities separate with some decisions holding that Steve is guilty
of manslaughter: R v Betty (1964) 48 Cr App R 6; R v Reid (1976) 62 Cr App R 109;
R v Stewart and Schofield [1995] 1 Cr App R 441; R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930.
In contrast, there are other decisions which hold that Steve has no liability for
manslaughter because Peter’s murderous intent was not foreseen by Steve, and
therefore was not part of their joint enterprise: R v Dunbar [1988] Crim LR 693; R v
Uddin [1998] 2 All ER 744; R v Powell and Daniels; English [1997] 4 All ER 545, HL.
6 [1985] AC 168, [1984] 3 WLR 677.
7 [1991] 1 QB 134 at 139, per Lord Lane CJ.
8 [1999] 1 AC 1, [1997] 4 All ER 545.
9 [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129.
10 That said, differences in culpability are reflected in the minimum term that the
convicted murderer has to serve in prison before he can apply to be released on
licence.
11 R v Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 496 at [29]. See also R v Badza [2009] EWCA Crim
2695.
12 [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129.
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Crown’s contention that to convict a secondary party of murder all that
party would have to foresee is the principal’s actus reus—the unlawful
killing of the victim. Foresight of the principal’s murderous intent would
not be needed for secondary liability for murder.13 On the face of it this
seems to be a serious extension of secondary liability for murder, but in
fact it is not. Richard Buxton explains:
When dealing, as in Rahman and the cases relied on, with foresight of a
violent act, that will almost always be assumed to carry with it foresight of
the mental state with which it is done: if D contemplates that P may use a
knife on his victim he will not contemplate that that will be done in a
benevolent spirit.14
However, the consequence of the Hyde principle is that it is possible that
a secondary party could be guilty of murder on the basis of not much
more than mere association with a joint enterprise, for example, by
being a member of a gang. In R v Mitchell15 the defendant and her friends
became involved in a violent argument and fight over a taxi with
another group of people. The fight ended. The defendant’s co-
defendants went to a nearby house and armed themselves with
weapons. She did not go with them. They returned to the car park
where they saw the opposing party and chased them. Having caught up
with them, an assault ensued and fatal head injuries were caused to the
victim. At the time, the defendant was in the car park looking for her
shoes. It was left open to the jury to conclude that the enterprise that the
defendant had joined at the time of the argument over the taxi still
continued at the time of the fatal attack. She, by her continued presence
in the car park, had not withdrawn from it. The defendant was therefore
convicted of murder even though it was accepted that she may not have
participated in the second assault at all.16 The Court of Appeal dismissed
her appeal holding that by remaining thereabouts the defendant was
still within the joint enterprise. This decision shows the harshness of the
law of joint enterprise as the effect of the Hyde principle is that:
[P]rosecutions for murder on the basis of joint enterprise have become
more common in recent years and are increasingly focussed on evidence of
association or alleged gang membership. There is increasing potential for
cases to be left to juries largely on the basis of evidence of association
between defendants, a trend which we believe is directly related to the
[Hyde] principle.17
If the Hyde principle is to continue to be part of the common law of joint
enterprise, then it must be applied in a consistent and robust way to
13 Above n. 12 at [23].
14 R. Buxton, ‘Joint Enterprise’ [2009] Crim LR 233 at 235.
15 [2008] EWCA Crim 2552, [2009] 1 Cr App R 31.
16 House of Commons Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise, Eleventh Report of Session
10–12 HC 1597 (2012) 9, para. 15, available at http://www.wronglyaccusedperson.org.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Justice-Committee-Joint-Enterprise-Report-2012.pdf,
accessed 29 October 2012. See also R v O’Flaherty [2004] EWCA Crim 526; R v Bryce
[2004] EWCA Crim 1231.
17 House of Commons Justice Committee, above n. 16 at 15–16, para. 37, quoting
comments by Tim Moloney QC and Simon Natas on the Law Commission 2007
proposals to retain the principle (see n. 20 below).
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avoid potential miscarriages of justice. There must be strong prima facie
evidence that the secondary party foresaw a real risk that, during the
joint enterprise, the principal might kill with an intention to cause really
serious harm or to kill.18 In addition, the principle should be supple-
mented by a requirement that there must be some evidence of assistance
or encouragement of the murder so that it was truly part of the joint
enterprise.19 At present the law of joint enterprise is uncertain, so
citizens cannot govern their future conduct by it and that raises doubt as
to whether it is compliant with Article 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which requires the criminal law to be ascertainable and
certain.
The Law Commission has recommended the retention of the Hyde
principle for two reasons. First, a secondary party can avoid liability by
convincing the jury that the collateral offence of murder was committed
in a fundamentally different way from that foreseen by the secondary
party. Secondly, the secondary party can show that he or she clearly and
unambiguously withdrew from the enterprise before the murder took
place.20 These two possibilities will now be examined.
The ‘fundamental difference’ rule
This rule was considered by the House of Lords in R v Rahman.21 The
facts were that there had been a history of confrontation between
groups of white males and groups of Asian males in Leeds. On 20 April
2004 there was an encounter involving minor violence in which the
Asians came off worse and there was talk of revenge. An opportunity for
this arose on 22 April when the victim and some of his friends were
sighted by a larger Asian group, the members of this group were armed
with blunt instrument weapons and at least one knife. The common
purpose of the Asian men was to cause serious injury to the victim and
his friends. The victim was cornered at the back of a house where he was
assaulted with the blunt instruments, and during this attack he was
stabbed three times. One wound in his back was made with such force
that the knife penetrated to a depth of at least 8 cm. The wounds proved
fatal. This pathological evidence lead to the conclusion that the un-
known principal acted with an intention to kill. The four appellants
were convicted as secondary parties to the murder of the victim by the
unknown principal.
The appeal was based on the trial judge’s direction to jury, the key
point being that, although the judge had directed the jury to consider
18 So that there is a realistic prospect of conviction as required by the Code for Crown
Prosecutors (2010) paras 4.5 and 4.6, available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/
docs/code2010english.pdf, accessed 29 October 2012.
19 As Professor Graham Virgo points out, joint enterprise is, in the strictest sense, a
misnomer because the doctrine concerns liability for an offence that is a departure
from the agreed joint venture: House of Commons Justice Committee, above n. 16
at 7.
20 Law Commission, Participating in Crime, Law Commission Report No. 305, Cm. 7084
(2007) paras 3.8 and 3.146, available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/
assisting-crime.htm, accessed 29 October 2012.
21 [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129.
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whether the use of the knife was ‘in a different league’,22 the appellants
argued that the judge should have differentiated between the common
purpose of the group to cause serious harm and, on the basis of the
pathological evidence, the principal’s intention to kill. The appellants
argued that the failure to direct the jury on that issue was a misdirection.
The jury decided that the appellants knew about the knife, and thus
determined that its use was not a radical departure from the common
purpose of the joint enterprise to cause serious injury, but they did not
consider whether the principal killing with an intention to kill was a
radical departure (or fundamentally different) from the common
purpose.
The House of Lords was unanimous in rejecting the appellants’ ap-
peal. Lord Neuberger set out why the appeal was rejected:
Accordingly, in the absence of special factors, and subject to any good
reason to the contrary, I consider that, even if the primary perpetrator
intended to kill the victim, an alleged accessory should not escape a murder
conviction simply because he only foresaw or expected that the perpetrator
intended to cause serious injury. The mere fact that the perpetrator in-
tended to kill does not render his actions ‘entirely’ or ‘fundamentally’
different from what the alleged accessory foresaw or intended.23
So if a principal kills with an intention to kill and the secondary party
only foresees that the principal will act with an intention to cause
serious harm, the principal’s more culpable state of mind does not make
his murder of the victim fundamentally different (or a radical departure)
so as to take it outside the common purpose to cause serious harm. This
is not surprising as it makes no difference to secondary liability for
murder whether the secondary party foresaw that the principal’s mens
rea was an intention to cause serious harm or an intention to kill so long
as one of them is foreseen as either is sufficient mens rea for murder
liability as a principal.24
The Hyde principle and the ‘fundamental difference’ rule
In R v Hyde the Court of Appeal set out the basis of secondary liability for
the collateral offence to a joint enterprise.25 The House of Lords in R v
English qualified this basis with the fundamental difference rule.26 In R v
Rahman this law is restated by Lord Brown as follows:
If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill
or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to partici-
pate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental element
22 Above n. 21 at [18].
23 Ibid. at [87].
24 In R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930, the Court of Appeal held that Steve, if he
foresees that Peter might intentionally cause non-serious harm to Victor would be
guilty of manslaughter even if Peter kills Victor with an intent to kill or to cause
serious harm, unless Peter’s manner of doing so is fundamentally different from that
which Steve foresaw. The fact that Peter acted with a more serious intention than
Steve foresaw that he might does not of itself amount to a fundamental difference.
See also R v Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568.
25 R v Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134 at 139, per Lord Lane CJ.
26 [1999] 1 AC 1, [1997] 4 All ER 545 at 564, per Lord Hutton.
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for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in the course
of the venture unless (i) A suddenly produces and uses a weapon of which B
knows nothing and which is more lethal than any weapon which B contemplates
that A or any other participant may be carrying and (ii) for that reason A’s act is to
be regarded as fundamentally different from anything foreseen by B. . . .27
Lord Scott, Lord Rodger and Lord Neuberger endorsed the restatement
of the law proposed by Lord Brown. The law can be summarised as
follows: if a secondary party participates in a joint enterprise in which
the principal commits murder, the secondary party will become liable
for that collateral offence if he contemplated that there was a real risk
that the principal might act with the mens rea for murder in furtherance
of the common purpose unless the English qualification applies. The
qualification requires that the principal suddenly produces and uses a
weapon of which the secondary party knows nothing and which is more
lethal than any weapon of which the secondary party was aware. If this
qualification is satisfied, there is no secondary liability for the collateral
offence. The facts of English provide an example where the purpose of
the joint enterprise was to attack and cause injury to a police officer
using wooden posts, but, in the course of the attack, the principal used
a knife with which he stabbed the police officer to death. There was a
reasonable possibility that the secondary party, English, had no know-
ledge that the principal was carrying a knife. His murder conviction was
quashed because of this lack of knowledge and because the knife
was more lethal than wooden posts.
The ‘fundamental difference’ rule can apply in all cases other than
those where the secondary party intended death to occur. This means
that the secondary party may be able to rely on the rule even though he
has foreseen (but not intended) that the principal may act with an
intention to kill, but the principal kills using a more lethal weapon of
which the secondary party knows nothing. If the secondary party has
agreed to perpetrate a joint enterprise being aware that the principal
may act with an intention to kill, should it matter how the principal
carries out that intention? Also, it is unclear why the rule only applies
when the principal ‘suddenly produces’ the more lethal weapon. Surely
what is relevant to liability is whether or not the secondary party
foresaw the use of the weapon.
Despite Lord Brown limiting the operation of the rule to weapons it
must also apply to acts themselves. For example, in Attorney-General’s
Reference (No. 3 of 2004),28 the act done by the principal—shooting the
victim at point blank range—was of a fundamentally different nature
from the act foreseen by the secondary party, namely an unlawful act to
frighten involving the firearm being deliberately discharged near the
victim. The secondary party did not foresee the possibility of any
physical harm to the victim, least of all intentional harm.
27 R v Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129 at [68], emphasis in the original;
the first part of the restatement represents the Hyde principle whilst the italicised
words reflect the English qualification.
28 [2005] EWCA Crim 1882.
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Their Lordships had contrasting views on the operation of the ‘funda-
mental difference’ rule and this is shown in their consideration of R v
Gamble.29 In that case (a non-jury trial) four members of the Ulster
Volunteer Force went to inflict a knee-capping punishment on a delin-
quent member of the Force. But during the punishment the principals
killed the victim by cutting his throat with extreme violence. The two
secondary parties were acquitted of murder because the deliberate
killing of the victim was a fundamental departure from the knee-
capping punishment. Lord Bingham thought that Gamble was correctly
decided: ‘. . . what, as I understand, was held to exonerate Douglas and
McKee was that the violence in fact inflicted with the knife was of an
entirely different character in an entirely different context from that
which they had foreseen and, in that sense, bargained for. The result
seems to me consistent with authority’.30 In contrast Lord Brown, Lord
Scott and Lord Neuberger had difficulty agreeing with that decision in
terms of the qualified Hyde principle. It is submitted that Carswell J in
Gamble and Lord Bingham got it right. At first sight it is difficult to see
how a knife could be more lethal than a loaded gun, but when the use
of those weapons is taken into account, it becomes apparent that, in
those circumstances, the knife was more lethal and its use a radical
departure from the common purpose to inflict a knee-capping
punishment.
In R v Mendez and Thompson31 the Court of Appeal reworked the
‘fundamental difference’ rule to make directions more understandable
for juries. However, in doing so, the court made the rule more propitious
to secondary parties. In reworking the rule, the court endorsed as sound
in principle the argument of the appellant’s counsel:
In cases where the common purpose is not to kill but to cause serious harm,
[the secondary party] is not liable for the murder of V if the direct cause
of V's death was a deliberate act by [the principal] which was of a kind
(a) unforeseen by [the secondary party] and (b) likely to be altogether
more life-threatening than acts of the kind intended or foreseen by [the
secondary party].32
This formulation is whether the principal’s deliberate act was unfore-
seen by the secondary party and could be regarded as being ‘altogether
more life-threatening than acts of the nature’ intended or foreseen by
the secondary party.33 This avoids the difficulties of establishing
whether, for example, a stab wound caused by a knife is fundamentally
different from being beaten with an iron bar. Consider the facts of
Gamble34 to reflect on why the reformulation is more favourable to
secondary parties. For the majority in Rahman the application of Lord
Brown’s restatement would mean a conviction for murder should
ensue, but applying the reworking in Mendez, it would not. However, it
29 [1998] NI 268.
30 [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129 at [29].
31 [2010] EWCA Crim 516, [2011] QB 876.
32 Ibid. at [45].
33 Ibid. at [48].
34 [1998] NI 268.
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is submitted that, if the doctrine of precedent is to be applied robustly in
the criminal law, then the qualified Hyde principle as restated in Rahman
by Lord Brown is that which is binding on trial courts.
Withdrawal
If there is some evidence of prior agreement between the secondary
party and the principal, then an effective withdrawal in complicity
requires that the secondary party tell the principal unequivocally that he
is withdrawing from the joint enterprise, but also (assuming the crime is
about to take place) to take some action to prevent or stop the crime
such as restraining the principal.35 If there is a spontaneous joint enter-
prise without prior agreement, it appears that communication of with-
drawal is not required. In R v O’Flaherty36 spontaneous violence
occurred between two groups of individuals. At place A, there was an
exchange of blows between the deceased and the three appellants, F, R
and T, each of whom was respectively armed with a cricket bat, a bottle
and a claw hammer. The deceased was then pursued by other indi-
viduals. F followed that pursuit to place B, where the deceased was on
the ground surrounded and being assailed by a number of men. F
advanced to within a few feet of the prone body still armed with the
cricket bat, which he did not use again, and was the first to move away
from the scene. R and T did not enter place B. At place B the deceased
had sustained a head injury and stab wound which killed him. F, R, T
and others were convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal quashed R
and T’s conviction because by not going to place B they had withdrawn
from the joint enterprise even though they had not communicated that
withdrawal. In contrast the court held that F remained liable because he
had gone to place B and therefore had not withdrawn from the joint
enterprise. It seems that if, on the facts in Mitchell above, the defendant’s
co-defendants had chased the victim out of the car park, she could have
been regarded as withdrawing from the joint enterprise. This is unjust
because R and T in O’Flaherty were more culpable as they were armed
and the defendant in Mitchell was not. The law is too tightly drawn.
Conclusion
It has been said that the House of Lords’ attempt to clarify the law of
joint enterprise in Rahman has failed,37 but is that really true? The law is
complex as the recent decision in R v Gnango38 shows, but that was an
unusual and unique case and must be regarded as turning on its own
35 R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212.
36 [2004] EWCA Crim 526, [2004] 2 Cr App R 20.
37 Professor David Ormerod commentary to R v A [2011] Crim LR 61 at 65.
38 [2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 AC 827.
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facts.39 In many cases, joint enterprise involves the application of prin-
ciples of accessorial liability—they cover the same ground. Where they
separate, the Hyde principle, as qualified, applies. That principle should
be applied in a more robust way. It is submitted that the law also needs
to be improved by the Hyde principle being supplemented with the
requirement that there must also be evidence of assisting or encouraging
the murder, i.e. there is both mens rea and an actus reus. These changes
should prevent secondary party convictions for murder being based on
not much more than mere association. It would mean accessorial liabil-
ity and joint enterprise would completely overlap. The House of Com-
mons Justice Committee has recommended that the DPP issue guidance
as to the proper threshold at which association becomes evidence of
involvement in crime.40 That guidance should require Crown Prosecu-
tors, when considering the Hyde principle, to have, in addition, evidence
of assisting or encouraging the murder. The DPP promised to consult on
that threshold,41 but as at yet that consultation has not been issued.
Clear guidance could put the law into a workable state which is fairer to
secondary parties.42
39 Lord Phillips and Lord Judge considered it undesirable to use the Hyde principle in
connection with the offence of affray ([2011] UKSC 59, [2012] 1 AC 827 at [41]).
It is unclear as to why this obiter dictum should be limited to affray, but if it is a
general view, then that would mean that there would be no secondary liability for
the collateral offence of murder unless the secondary party intended that it be
committed.
40 House of Commons Justice Committee, above n. 16 at 14, para. 33.
41 See at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_statements/statement_from_the_dpp_in_response_
to_the_house_of_commons_justice_committee_report_on_joint_enterprise/, 17 January
2012, accessed 25 August 2012.
42 The House of Commons Justice Committee has also recommended that the
government should consult on the Law Commission’s proposals in its 2007 Report
Participating in Crime as they would form (in the Committee’s view) an excellent
starting point to legislation. The concern with those proposals is that doctrinally
they start from the premise that accessorial liability and joint enterprise are
separate, whereas this comment has shown that in many cases they overlap. The
clauses to the draft Bill attached to the Report only provide a skeleton for the law
of complicity which, if enacted, could lead to further complex case law. See
G. R. Sullivan, ‘Participating in Crime: Law Com No. 305—Joint Criminal Ventures’
[2008] Crim LR 19. 
Joint Enterprise and Murder
471
